Abstract
Introduction
Symmetry is an obvious phenomenon in two-way communications that follow a request/response paradigm, such as HTTP traffic, DNS traffic, NTP traffic and some types of ICMP traffic. In these communications, one party sends a request to its peer party, and waits for a reply before sending any more packets. For such communications, it is anomalous to observe an aggressive sending rate coupled with a low response rate. Usually, such an anomalous event may indicate that some local hosts are involved in an attack. A source-end defense system may be deployed to detect those anomalies that disrupt the symmetry in these two-way communications [1] , but it is now challenged by the subtlety and complexity of the malicious traffic, and the bottleneck is how to select thresholds to adapt to the variability of network traffic.
In this paper, a nonparametric adaptive CUSUM (Cumulative Sum) method is presented to meet this challenge. Three distinct features make this method different from others in anomaly detection of symmetric network traffic. (i) No assumption is made on the distribution of the observations. (ii) Its detection threshold is self-adjusted so that it can adapt itself to various traffic conditions. (iii) It can react to the end of an anomaly within a required delay time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a brief overview of the related work is given. In section 3, the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method is presented in details. In section 4, performance analysis is made in terms of probability of false alarms and detection delays. In section 5, experiments on source-end defense against SYN flooding attacks are conducted to validate the efficacy of this nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method in detecting low intensity anomalies. And section 6 summarizes this paper..
Related work
In a few papers [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , several methods are proposed for anomaly detection when distribution of the observations involves unknown parameters. Although these methods are successful in some conditions, two shortcomings of them are exposed when used in anomaly detection of network traffic. The first one is all the methods are designed with fixed configurations, which can not adapt to the frequent changes of network traffic. The second one is they all require a parametric model for the observations so that corresponding probability distribution functions can be applied to the design and analysis of these methods; in practice, however, it is usually very difficult to have a prior knowledge about the distribution of network traffic. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to design an "intelligent" detection method which can automatically adjust its parameters to achieve the best performance possible and work without a prior knowledge about the distribution of the observations, that is, it is nonparametric.
In [7] , we proposed an adaptive method for anomaly detection in symmetric network traffic. Although it was proved effective in source-end detection of SYN flooding attacks, it still depends on a parametric model of normal distribution of the observations. In [8] , a nonparametric CUSUM method is proposed. It has been used in detecting SYN flooding attacks [9] [10] [11] [12] . Nevertheless, there are two problems with this method when it is applied to anomaly detection. One is the obscurity in setting detection threshold and offset constant which is used to ensure the mean of the observations is negative. The other is its slow response to the end of an anomaly. The problem results from excessive cumulation of abnormalities and it may result in false alarms. In [13] , we proposed a nonparametric method in order to solve both problems. Although it can work when there are no prior knowledge about the distribution of the observations, it is still semi-adaptive since the detection threshold is empirically pre-determined.
In recent years, source-end defense against DDoS has been a hotspot in network security. Several methods have been proposed for anomaly detection of the source-end traffic. Among them, the one used in the D-WARD system [14] is widely accepted. It adopts a set of legitimate traffic models to identify legitimate traffic and detect or constrain malicious traffic. Unfortunately, these models need to be updated periodically and therefore cannot adapt to the frequent changes in network traffic.
Design of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method

Problem formulation
Let us begin by giving the problem formulation of anomaly detection in symmetric network traffic before we give a formal definition of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method.
Suppose X={x n , n=1,2,…} is a sequence of independent random variables observed sequentially, and x n =(O n +1)/(I n +1). Respectively, O n and I n denote the number of outgoing requests and incoming replies collected within the nth observation period. For symmetric traffic, O n is approximately equal to I n , thus we have x n ≈1. Normally, the mean of X (denoted by μ X ) is stable and close to 1. At a certain moment (random and unknown), an anomalous event occurs and μ X is increased. When the anomaly ends, the mean of X is decreased to normal. Figure 1 describes this process. However, no prior knowledge is known about the probability distribution function of X. Objective of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method is to accurately detect the start and the end of such an anomalous event as soon as possible. Figure.2 shows a high-level view of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method. It consists of three key modules. The first one is for outlier processing; the second one is for data smoothing and transformation; and the last one is for nonparametric adaptive CUSUM detection. Alarm signal output is decided by d(n), a decision function by which "d(n)=1" corresponds to an anomaly at moment n and "d(n)=0" to normal operations.
Design of the method
Outlier Processing
This module aims at (i) simplifying the detection of high intensity anomalies, and (ii) improving accuracy of the following detection by discarding outliers.
A simple threshold T O is set to filter outliers in the input observations. Those larger than T O are considered outliers and will be discarded at once. Moreover, the number of successive outliers is cumulated by a counter A O . Once A O increases to K O (a preset parameter which is consistent with the requirement on detection delay of the start of an anomaly), an alarm signal is output, which means a high intensity anomaly occurs. Observations that are below T O will be further processed by the other two modules to reduce missing alarms caused by the outlier processing module and improve efficacy of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method in detecting low intensity anomalies. Flowchart of the outlier processing module is given in Figure 3 , where AlarmDur is for cumulation of alarming time, A N and A D are defined in the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM detection modules.
Figure.3 Flowchart of the outlier processing module
Data smoothing and transformation
By the simple moving average algorithm (for data smoothing), a new sequence,
and N denotes the sliding window size.
However, Y is still unsuitable to be taken as the direct input of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM detection module, because one of the assumptions for a CUSUM method is that mean of the input is negative under normal conditions, and it becomes positive when a change occurs [15] . In [9] [10] [11] [12] , this problem is solved by setting an offset constant empirically, but it is not optimal for the frequently changing network conditions. In this paper, two measures are taken to solve this problem.
(1) Make on-line estimations of the distribution parameters of Y, including its mean value ) ( N n μ n  and its standard deviation ) ( N n σ n  . This measure involves:
updating n μ and n σ by the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) algorithm where the EWMA factor is denoted by p:
, where
This measure distinguishes the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method from other CUSUM method. Its rationality is based on the Chebyshev inequality, according to which we have
Since the Chebyshev inequality just gives a conservative bound of the statistic, a negative mean value of z n is then guaranteed in a high probability, as makes z n suited for being direct input of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM detection module.
Nonparametric adaptive CUSUM detection
In order to reduce overhead of on-line implementation, the recursive version of the CUSUM method [8, 15] is adopted in the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM detection module. Its implementation is shown as follows.
where s n is the test statistic. In order to implement adaptive adjustment of the detection threshold, a temporary variable, T A , is set and initialized to zero. Figure 4 describes the flowchart of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM module in detecting the start of an anomaly. In this figure, K A is a preset parameter which is consistent with the requirement on detection delay of the start of an anomaly. Different from other CUSUM methods, the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method stops cumulating the test statistic once an alarm is raised. But then, it continues monitoring Z so that the alarm can be canceled as soon as possible when the anomaly ceases. Moreover, it is up to the users to specify their requirements on detection delay of the end of an anomaly. Suppose an alarm is raised at the mth observation period. Then, the following two cases are considered as indications of the end of an anomaly.
The first case is continuous occurrences of z n ≤0 (n>m). A variable, A N , is set for cumulation of such occurrences, and it is initialized to zero. When A N is increased to K N (a preset parameter which is consistent with the requirement on detection delay of the end of an anomaly), the alarm is canceled.
The second case is abrupt decrease of x n (n>m) when z n >0. In the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method, update of n μ and n σ is stopped once an alarm is raised. If the anomaly lasts for a long time, n μ and n σ might be underestimated; this might result in false alarms. In order to reduce these false alarms, two variables are involved. One is T D , which is a self-adjusting variable for judging abrupt decrease of x n when z n >0. In this method, abrupt decrease of x n is ascertained when
. T D is initialized by the first discarded observation and updated with the EWMA method. The other variable is A D , which is for cumulating occurrences of abrupt decrease of x n . When A D is increased to K D (a preset parameter which is consistent with the requirement on detection delay of the end of an anomaly), the alarm is canceled.
In both cases, all variables will be reset to zero once the alarm is canceled if the duration of an anomaly exceeds a user specified time (denoted by T L ). 
Performance Analysis
Probability of false alarms
False alarms arise from the outlier processing module and the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM module. Thus, probability of false alarms can be decided by the expression of is. Moreover, we needn't worry about missing alarms due to a higher value of T O , since observations below T O will be further processed by the other modules, as is mentioned in sub-section 3.2.1. K O is a preset parameter which is consistent with the requirement on detection delay of the start of an anomaly. In anomaly detection, a sampling period is usually taken as the unit of detection delay. Thus, K O is an integer larger than 0. The larger K O is, the lower ) (
Estimation of C f P involves an intricate deduction, in which several conclusions in [8] for the nonparametric CUSUM method on the probability of false alarms are referred. In order to keep this paper concise and legible, we leave out the details of this deduction and just give our conclusion on It is worth noting that this is only a conservative estimation of C f P and the actual performance may be better than it.
Detection delays
Two types of detection delay are involved in the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method. Respectively, they are s 
This conclusion is deduced based on the working principle of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method and relevant conclusions in [8] . It can be used to estimate detection delays of this method.
Experimental evaluation
In this section, we focus on source-end defense against SYN flooding attacks to illustrate efficacy of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method and validate accuracy of the two relevant conclusions presented in section 4.
Detecting SYN flooding attacks at their sources may be included in the category of anomaly detection in symmetric network traffic. In a normal TCP three-way handshake, an outgoing SYN request always induces an incoming SYN/ACK reply within a round trip time. Thus, the proportion of outgoing SYNs to incoming SYN/ACKs is approximately 1:1. When a SYN flooding attack occurs, discrepancy between the number of outgoing SYNs and that of incoming SYN/ACKs is enlarged. This forms a key feature of the attack at its source-end network. Respectively, the number of outgoing SYN requests and that of incoming SYN/ACK replies within the nth observation period correspond to O n and I n in the problem formulation in section 3.
Experiments were conducted on three real traffic traces from the NLANR group (http://pma.nlanr.net). The first trace was gathered at the University of Leipzig with an OC3 PoS link connected to the German research network. The other two were gathered at the University of Auckland with an OC3 Internet access link. A summary of these traces is given in Table 1 . Seven parameters need to be preset in the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method. The first one is sampling period in the experiments. It is set to 20 seconds, as is consistent with those in [9] [10] [11] [12] . Then, there are the outlier filtering threshold T O and a time limit T L beyond which all variables in this method are reset to zero. Both parameters are set as T O =3 and T L =6. The last four parameters are related to the detection delays. Respectively, they are K O , K A , K N and K D . As mentioned in section 4.2, these parameters are preset as K O =K A =K s and K N =K D =K e , where K s and K e are specified by the users. In this paper, different combinations of K s and K e are used in the experiments to evaluate detection delays of the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method.
Performance evaluation is divided into two steps. In the first step, probability of false alarms is evaluated by applying the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method to the original traffic traces. In the second step, probability of detection, detection delays and the lowest intensity of the attacks (denoted by λ min ) that can be detected are evaluated. A large number of experiments were conducted, and in each of them a SYN flooding attack was generated. All these attacks lasted 10 minutes, a typical duration of DDoS attacks observed in the Internet [16] . Moreover, these attacks in different experiments were started at an interval of 1 minute. By this way, objectivity of the experiment results is guaranteed. Three rules are followed in these experiments to confirm a valid detection of the attacks. (i) Minimum of the attack traffic generated in an experiment is 1/10 of the averaged normal traffic during an attack, and the maximum is ten times as strong as the averaged normal traffic during the attack. Table 2~Table 4 give the experiment results. Note：323 experiments were conducted for each combination of (Ks, Ke).
From these results, we can draw the following conclusions. Firstly, probability of false alarms (P f ) decreases with the increase of K s . By comparison, K e has no influence on P f when K s is kept unchanged. This is consistent with expression (2) . However, λ min shows a tendency to increase when K s ≥4. Therefore, both P f and λ min should be taken into account when setting K s . Based on the experiment results, we suggest setting K s =5 or K s =6 in practice.
Secondly, λ min shows a tendency to decrease with the increase of K e when K s is kept unchanged. However, increasing K e may result in increase of τ e , as should be given full consideration. In practice, we suggest setting K e =2 or K e =3.
Thirdly, s
 ( e  ) tends to K s (K e ) with the increase of K s (K e ). Further analysis of the experiment results may make this conclusion more intuitionistic. Let Table 5 and Table 6 . As we can see, the convergent tendencies of s  →K s and e  →K e are obvious. This is consistent with expression (3). Lastly, the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method has an advantage over the existing nonparametric CUSUM method. As we can see from the experiment results, it is a commonplace that the average of min λ (denoted by min λ ) is below 0.2. Under the same requirements on detection delay (here, it refers to s  ) and probability of detection, however,
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. 0 min  λ is the best result achieved by the existing nonparametric CUSUM method [9] .
Conclusion
In this paper, a nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method is presented. This method can be used for anomaly detection in symmetric network traffic. It requires little knowledge of the network traffic except its symmetry. Two distinct features of this method are emphasized. Firstly, it succeeds in implementing a self-adjusting detection threshold, which makes it adapt to various traffic conditions. Secondly, it reacts quickly to the end of the anomalies. Moreover, several practical expressions for evaluating the nonparametric adaptive CUSUM method on its probability of false alarms and detection delays are deduced. Experiments on real traffic traces validate these expressions and show the efficacy of this method in detecting low intensity attacks. In the future, we plan to employ this method in detecting other DDoS attacks such as DRDoS, SYN/ACK attacks and RESET attacks. 
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